Yea, I'm in the process of converting our complete ETL infrastructure from SSIS/SQL Server to Python/PostgreSQL. Next step is Office 365, which will be more difficult, but doable since we are a small company anyway.

Are you converting the SSIS automatically somehow or rewriting it?

Outside of work, I don't use Windows very often if at all. I have a 2017 laptop that Microsoft made, and it is so damn sluggish for absolutely no reason, its VERY VERY vanilla mind you.

Apple also holds back the tech industry in many ways. All companies seem willing to put profits before progress.

They have been holding back the tech industry for decades now.

i remember years and years ago learning some posix/shell syntax and working in terminal. felt like my love for windows unraveled in real time. these days using windows... feel like i gotta take a shower after. like many i was just raised on windows it was the household operating system i had like 20 years of general computer usage under my belt on windows before i finally felt a mac trackpad for the first time. that hardware experience alone was the first pillar kicked out upholding my "windows is the best" philosophies. then i got into coding, then i tripped and fell out of hourly boeing slave labor into a sql job (lost 55% yearly income, no regrets yo). then i started discovering the open source world, and learned just how much computing goes on outside of the world of windows and how many insanely bright minds are out there contributing to... not microsoft. now i have linux and macos machines everywhere, i still haven't found the bottom but the last 6-7 years or so have been a really rich journey.

currently have a 32bit win xp env spun up in 86box just to compile a project in some omega old visual studio dotnet 7 and the service pack update at the time (don't ask). it is seriously _wild_ being in there, feels like stepping into a time machine. nostalgia aside, the OS is for the most part... quiet. doesn't bother you, everything is kind of exactly where you expect it to be, no noise in my start menu, there isnt some omega bing network callstack in my explorer, no prompts to o365 my life up.

it feels kinda sad, what an era that was. it's just more annoying to do any meaningful work in windows these days.

im currently working with c/cpp the idiot way (nothing about my story is ever conventional sigh), by picking a legacy project from like 22 years ago. this has forced me to step back into old redhat 7.1+icc5, old windows xp + dotnet7 like i explained above, and im definitely taking the most unpragmatic approach ever diving in here.. but there's one thing that absolutely sticks out to me: microsoft has always tried to capitalize on everything. tool? money. vendor lock. os? money. vendor lock. entire industries/education system capture? lotta money. lotta vendor lock. lotta generational knowledge lock.

they are lucky people are still using github. theyve tried to poke the bear a few times and theyre slowly but surely enshittifying the place, but im just kinda losing any reverence for microsoft altogether. microsoft has been big for a hot minute now, they have their eras. you can feel when things are driven by smart visionary engineers working behind the scenes, and you can tell when things are in pure slop mode microservice get rich or die trying mode. yea, microsoft has.. always been vendor-lock aggro and kinda hostile, but the current era microsoft is by far the grossest it's ever been. see: microsoft teams (inb4 "i use teams every day, i dont have a problem with it")

im aware people smarter than me can write diatribes on why windows is the best at x thing, but im only informed by my own experience of having to use all three (linux/macos/windows) for my professional work life: i grew up thinking windows was the best.. now im like mostly confident that windows is actually the worst lol. by a pretty damn decent margin. i was gaslit for ages

For what it’s worth, Trusted Signing verification has been a moving target over the last 12 months. It was open for individuals, then it was closed to anyone except (iirc) US businesses with DUNS numbers, then it opened again to US based individuals (and a few other countries perhaps).

My completely uninformed guess was that someone had done something naughty with Trusted Signing-issued code signing certificates.

Anyway, when I first saw the VeraCrypt thing this morning my initial reaction was “I wonder if this is them pushing developers onto trusted signing the hard way?”

I like the idea of a central signing authority for open source. While this might go against the spirit of open source, I think it eventually creates a critical mass and outcry if Microsoft or Google would play games with them. Also foundations might be a good way to protect against legal trouble distributing OSS under different regulations. I am imagining e.g. an FDroid that plays Googles game. With reproducible or at least audited builds also some trusted authorities could actually produce more trusted builds especially at times of supply chain attacks. However, I think such distribution authorities would need really good governance and a lot of funding.

active directory and excel runs the world.

what is apple doing that is similar?

Looking at the rest of the tech industry in 2026 that might be a blessing.

Because a bad guy can also generate their own signing key and deploy it alongside the installer.

See Notepad++ for how that winds up.

To be fair, the tech industry been holding itself back for decades now too, since lots of people seemingly have somewhat low prices to go from being a FOSS evangelist to wearing a "Microsoft <3 Open Source" t-shirt.

There is nothing stopping you from using third party certificates to sign Windows binaries. It's just expensive. You don't even need a MS toolchain or CLI tool for it.

What does this even mean? It's like throwing around the word 'bloat'.

I strongly disagree on the Secure Boot front. It's necessary for FDE to have any sort of practical security, it reduces malicious/vulnerable driver abuse (making it nontrivial), bootkits are a security nightmare and would otherwise be much more common in malware typical users encounter, and ultimately the user can control their secure boot setup and enroll their own keys if they wish.

Does that mean that Microsoft doesn't also use it as a form of control? Of course not. But conflating "Secure Boot can be used for platform control" with "Secure Boot provides no security" is a non-sequitur.

I don't know about executable signing, but in the embedded world SecureBoot is also used to serve the customer; id est provide guarantees to the customer that the firmware of the device they receive has not been tampered with at some point in the supply chain.

This is like saying you shouldn't vaccinate your kids because no one gets polio anymore

I see what you did there.

Apple is also somewhat responsible for the attitude shift with the introduction of iOS. 20-25 years ago a locked down bootloader and only permitting signed code would have been seen by techies as dystopian. It's now quite normalized. They say it's about security but it's always been about control.

Stallman tried to warn us with "tivoization".

> I still hope that one of these days people in general will realize that executable signing and SecureBoot are specifically designed for controlling what a normal person can run, rather than for anything resembling real security

For home/business users I'd agree. But in Embedded / money-handling then it's a life-saver and a really important technology.

Thanks, the previous title was easy to miss: "Veracrypt project update"

> feel like i gotta take a shower after

I run Crossover and I feel like I gotta take a shower after. Just knowing there's a folder called drive_c on my Mac is the stuff of nightmares.

the US government is owned by corporate interests and has been in some capacity since inception. special mention to the Russians and Israelis and Saudis who also own a piece.

If only people didn't install Ask Jeeves toolbars all over the place and then asked their grandson during vacations to clean their computer.

Hmmm, so basically Google but you also pay for it?

you can always either disable secureboot and driver signature verification, or (the better solution) just enroll your own certificate in your TPM and sign the driver with that...

Windows actually isn't very cheap.

They did, just further into the article:

> According to a post on Hacker News, the popular VPN client WireGuard is facing the same issue.

Then you can publish the public Code Signing certificate for download/import or publish it through WinGet.

Using Azure Trusted Signing or any other certificate vendor does not guarantee that a binary is 100% trustworthy, it just means someone put their name on it.

> “Users who have enabled system encryption with VeraCrypt may face boot issues after July 2026 because Microsoft will revoke the [certificate authority] that was used to sign the VeraCrypt bootloader,” Idrassi said. “A new Microsoft CA must be used for bootloaders to continue working.”

> Without access to the Microsoft account used for sending software updates, “I will not be able to apply the required new signature to VeraCrypt, making it impossible to boot.”

We can explain it to you, but we can't understand it for you.

Explanation: Microslop is a power hungry, greedy and frankly evil corporation whose only goal is complete financial domination of the government, business, and personal tech industries. They actively promote making regressive software, increasing complexity, and hiding straightforward processes behind an information veil.

Example: Go to learn.microsoft.com and try to actually learn HOW to do anything. You'll read 35 pages of text talking about the concept of working with a specific microslop product but not 1 single explicit example of HOW to accomplish a specific task.

Example: Windows 11

Example: Copilot

The whole company is run by backassward tech hicks and digital yokels who can't think past a dime on the floor for a dollar in customer satisfaction, and somehow they run the majority of non-server space or personal device tech on the planet.

Full disk encryption protects from somebody yanking a hard drive from running server (actually happens) or stealing a laptop. Calling it useless because it doesn't match your threat model... I hate todays security people, can't threat model for shit.

that's just a byproduct of "job creators" holding the keys to a comfortable life over everyones head.

i dont think its fair to conflate the tech industries self-owns with microsofts damages. microsoft has for decades poured untold resources and money into capturing everything they possibly could to sustain themselves with honestly what i call cultural and software vendor lock. we're only just now seeing the gaming industry take its first real footsteps towards non-windows targets, but for the most part the decades of evangelizing Microsoft apis and bankrolling schools and education systems to carry courses for their way of doing things makes that a particularly uphill battle thats going to take a lot more time. people have built entire careers out of the microsoft-way in multiple industries. pure microsoft houses are still everywhere at many orgs, so many of them don't even recognize that there is another path. there's plenty of infra/dbadmin/devops people who are just pure windows still. there's multiple points where microsoft did have the best in class solution for something, but these days you'd be hard pressed to not go another way if you were starting from scratch. problem is such a lift and shift is really hard to do for orgs that have spent decades being a microsoft shop.

in a roundabout way, this sort of translates to real long lasting impact/damage to me. microsoft has always been such a force over history that it caused a massive rift in computing. no matter how much they embrace linux and claim to not fight the uphill battle of open source anymore, that modus operandi of locking people into their suite of things still exists on so many fronts and is in some ways more in your face than it's ever been. there's no benefit of the doubt to give here, i just have a hard time choosing microsoft for... well anything.

Anything that restricts user freedom is entirely bad, even if it's at the expense of security.

>It's necessary for FDE to have any sort of practical security

why? do you mean because evil maid attacks exist? anyone that cared enough about that specific vector just put their bootloader on a removable media. FDE wasn't somehow enabled by secure boot.

>bootkits are a security nightmare and would otherwise be much more common in malware

why weren't they more common before?

serious question. Back in the 90s viruses were huge business, BIOS was about as unprotected as it would ever possibly be, and lots of chips came with extra unused memory. We still barely ever saw those kind of malware.

I don't know about executable signing, but in the embedded world SecureBoot is also used to serve the PRODUCER; id est provide guarantees to the PRODUCER that the firmware of the device they SELL has not been tampered with at some point in the PROFIT chain.

well, unless govt tells MS to tamper it

> id est provide guarantees to the customer that the firmware of the device they receive has not been tampered with

The firmware of the device being a binary blob for the most part... Not like I trust it to begin with.

Whereas my open source Linux distribution requires me to disables SecureBoot.

What a world.

And what if that customer wants to run their own firmware, ie after the manufacturer goes out of business? "Security" in this case conveniently prevente that.

Computers should abide by their owners. Any computer not doing that is broken.

It's to serve the regulators. The Radio Equipment Directive essentially requires the use of secure boot fir new devices.

Yeah. I felt in a similar manner when I moved to Linux. Microsoft seemed to make people dumber. I do actually use both Linux and Windows (Win10 only), largely for testing various things, including java-related software. But every time I use Windows, I am annoyed at how slow everything is compared to Linux. (I should mention that I compile almost everything from source on Linux, so most of the default Linux stack I don't use; many linux distributions also suck by default, so I have to uncripple the software stack. I also use versioned appdirs similar as to how GoboLinux does, but in a more free form.)

I'm in Europe and ended up creating an organization since I have my own company, but they messed up the verification of one of the legitimate documents, and there was no way to reach them once they made that mistake. Frustrating, and definitely a lost customer for them.

If someone is willing to put in the work in governance, FOSS projects would be willing to fund it - at least Mudlet would be. We get income from Patreon to cover the costs.

ChromeOS and Android are definitely comparable.

Geez, this brings back memories.

At one time at our university we had table desktop dancers installed everywhere. Was kind of funny when it turned up just as a student wanted to defend their work in a lab.

And they say Linux is inconvenient because you have to open the terminal every once in a while.

I meant to say, in the title. As Wireguard is way more popular than VeraCrypt...

Microsoft has been trying to kill everything in computers that's not-Microsoft, for as long as I've been alive. Their actual power comes and goes, strengthens and weakens, but it's been a continuous background threat to personal computing since the first day something other than Microsoft tried to get traction in the industry.

So like banks requiring you to have a PIN on your ATM card, even if you don’t want one… that’s bad? Seatbelt laws are bad?

> serious question. Back in the 90s viruses were huge business,

No, they were not. They were toys written for fun and/or mischief. The virus authors did not receive any monetary reward from writing them, so they were not even a _business_. So they were the work of individuals, not large teams.

The turning point was Bitcoin. Suddenly it provided all those nice new business models that can be scaled up: mining, stealing cryptowallets, ransomware, etc.

> anyone that cared enough about that specific vector just put their bootloader on a removable media. FDE wasn't somehow enabled by secure boot.

Sure, but an attacker could still overwrite your kernel which your untouched bootloader would then happily run. With SB at least in theory you have a way to validate the entire boot chain.

> why weren't they more common before?

Because security of the rest of the system was not at the point where they made sense. CIH could wipe system firmware and physically brick your PC - why write a bootkit then? Malware then was also less financially motivated.

When malware moved from notoriety-driven to financially-driven in the 2000s, bootkits did become more common with things like Mebroot & TDL/Alureon. More recently, still before Secure Boot was widespread, we had things like the Classic Shell/Audacity trojan which overwrote your MBR: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DD9CvHVU7B4 and Petya ransomware. With SB this is an attack vector that has been largely rendered useless.

It's also a lot more difficult to write a malicious bootloader than it is to write a usermode app that runs itself at startup and pings a C2 or whatever.

Ah, yes, the [insert super inconvenient and complex thing to do that most people don’t know, want or should do] will solve it! And when that fails, surely the user can just write their own OS, right? Bunch of skill-issued complainers we the users are.

> or (the better solution) just enroll your own certificate in your TPM and sign the driver with that...

I'll tell Grandma that's what she needs to do.

agree, because "free" can be neither "cheap" nor "expensive"

But...it doesn't restrict user freedom. If the user wishes to do so, they can disable SB.

+1

An unsigned hash is plenty guard to against tampering. The supply chain and any secret sauce that went into that firmware is just trust. Trust that the blob is well intentioned, trust that you downloaded from the right URL, checked the right SHA, trust that the organization running the URL is sanctioned to do so by Microsoft...

Once all of that trust for every piece of software is concentrated in one organization, Microsoft, Apple or Google, is has become totally meaningless.

I make the analogy with a company, because on that front, ownership seems to matter a lot in the Western world. It's like it had to have unfaithful management appointed by another company they're a customer of, as a condition to use their products. Worse, said provider is also a provider for every other business, and their products are not interoperable. How long before courts jump in to prevent this and give back control to the business owner?

You can set up custom SecureBoot keys on your firmware and configure Linux to boot using it.

There's also plenty of folks combining this with TPM and boot measurements.

The ugly part of SecureBoot is that all hardware comes with MS's keys, and lots of software assume that you'll want MS in charge of your hardware security, but SecureBoot _can_ be used to serve the user.

Obviously there's hardware that's the exception to this, and I totally share your dislike of it.

you click the box to turn off secure boot

Then that customer shouldn't buy a device that doesn't allow for their use case. Exercise some personal agency. Sheesh.

Tradeoffs. Which is more likely here?

1. A customer wants to run their own firmware, or

2. Someone malicious close to the customer, an angry ex, tampers with their device, and uses the lack of Secure Boot to modify the OS to hide all trace of a tracker's existence, or

3. A malicious piece of firmware uses the lack of Secure Boot to modify the boot partition to ensure the malware loads before the OS, thereby permanently disabling all ability for the system to repair itself from within itself

Apple uses #2 and #3 in their own arguments. If your Mac gets hacked, that's bad. If your iPhone gets hacked, that's your life, and your precise location, at all times.

Its a simple solution in law to enable. Force manufacturers to allow owners of computer to put any signing key in the BIOS.

We need this law. Once we have this law, consumers csn get maximum benefit of secure boot withiut losing contorl

Microsoft has spent most of its life as a corporate bureaucracy that produces sales-and-marketing content, some of which happens to moonlight as software.

your grandma is probably fine with BitLocker....

Make sure that she setup a PKI infrastructure to manage certificate revocation as well, wouldn't want a bad grandson to mess with it.

I happen to like knowing that my mobile device did not have a ring 0 backdoor installed before it left the factory in Asia. SecureBoot gives me that confidence.

I mean, the super-easy option would be to just use BitLocker for FDE. No hassles, just works. But I fugured since everyone here on HN hates MS I wouldn't even bring that up. Don't trust MS? Enroll yourown keys

Well, the hope was always that those of us inconvenienced by M$ would all collectively contribute to making Linux distros more convenient for everyone. But we can't ever seem to get inconvenienced enough to actually sufficiently mobilize and/or coordinate such an effort.

Why would you put Grandma on VeriCrypt in the first place? It's the more 'difficult' option for FDE.

It's not free at all. If you buy Windows through the official channels it's quite expensive. If you buy it on the grey market, it's dirt cheap, though.

They shouldn't _have_ to do anything. The point is that no demands should be placed upon users.

Same problem with age gating. It's fine, as long as zero additional demands are placed upon users.

And will then be locked out from an increasing amount of Applications, Media, and eventually even Websites.

What happens when there are no more devices that allow for that use case? This is already pretty much the case for phones, it's only a matter of time until Microsoft catches up.

But that's how it already works.

If you install Windows first, Microsoft takes control (but it graciously allows Linux distros to use their key). If you install Linux first, you take control.

It's perfectly possible for you to maintain your own fully-secure trust chain, including a TPM setup which E.G. lets you keep a 4-digit pin while keeping your system secure against brute force attacks. You can't do that with the 1990s "encryption is all you need" style of system security.

> Its a simple solution in law to enable. Force manufacturers to allow owners of computer to put any signing key in the BIOS.

...it's already allowed. The problem is that this isn't the default, but opt in that you need quite a lot of knowledge to set up

...and then some essential software you need to run detects that and refuses to run. See where the problem is here?

> You can set up custom SecureBoot keys on your firmware and configure Linux to boot using it.

Right, but as engineers, we should resist the temptation to equate _possible_ with _practical_.

The mere fact that even the most business oriented Linux distributions have issues playing along SecureBoot is worrying. Essentially, SB has become a Windows only technology.

The promise of what SB could be useful for is even muddier. I would argue that the chances of being victim of firmware tampering are pretty thin compared to other attack vectors, yet somehow we end up all having SB and its most significant achievement is training people that disabling it is totally fine.

1. P(someone wants to run their own firmware)

2. P(someone wants to run their own firmware) * P(this person is malicious) * P(this person implants this firmware on someone else’s computer)

3. The firmware doesn’t install itself

Yeah I think 2 and 3 is vastly less likely and strictly lower than 1.

#2 and #3 are fearmongering arguments and total horseshit, excuse the strong language.

Should either of those things happen the bootloader puts up a big bright flashing yellow warning screen saying "Someone hacked your device!"

I use a Pixel device and run GrapheneOS, the bootloader always pauses for ~5 seconds to warn me that the OS is not official.

Yes use Bitlocker, the thing that uploads the encryption key to OneDrive "for convenience" thereby negating the whole point of FDE in the first place

This gets tricky. If I click on a link intending to view a picture of a cat, but instead it installs ransomware, is that abiding by its owner or not? It did what I told it to do, but not at all what I wanted.

No it doesn't? The factory programs in the secure boot public keys

Are the demands that users become experts in provider their own security against more advanced actors not significantly worse? The control part is unfortunate but the defaults should make it so users can focus on sharing pictures of cats without fear or need for advanced cyber security knowledge.

Freedom from the consequences of malware is more valuable than the low cost of turning SecureBoot off if you don’t want it.

We shouldn’t need the hassle of locks on our home and car doors, but we understand they are probably worthwhile for most people.

What's easier, and bitlocker doesn't count. I want my FDE to be based on a password or a keyfile, not simply by some code in the motherboard. I want it encrypted until I, the operator, provide some data to unlock.

In my limited experience with bitlocker, the disk is decryptable automatically as long as it's in the original motherboard.

It does seem like linux is having its moment right now. there's the money and effort valve is putting into KDE making the steamdeck and steammachine polished for their hardware which helps all users of KDE. cachyos is making having a rolling distro really smooth and snappy on old hardware and making games work mostly ootb. stuff like winboat and wine will let you use the few windows apps you need. you are kinda stuck though if you want to use something like fusion360 or solidworks. freecad has improved quite a bit but it's still like gimp where it's slightly worse UX in a lot of ways.

Users who care enough to do so can enrol their own keys using the extremely well documented process to do that.

Users who don’t care about the runtime integrity of their machine can just turn it off.

Both options are so easy that you could’ve learned how to do them on your machine in the time that you spent posting misinformation in this thread.

I run Linux with Secure Boot and I don't feel locked out of any media, applications, or websites.

My mom uses Secure Boot with Windows and doesn't know or care that it's enabled at all.

It does no such thing if you enrol your own keys using the extremely well documented process to do that.

As if the monetary gain of 2 and 3 never entered the picture. Malicious actors want 2 and 3 to make money off you! No one can make reasonable amounts of money off 1.

As an embedded programmer in my former life, the number of customers that had the capability of running their own firmware, let alone the number that actually would, rapidly approaches zero. Like it or not, what customers bought was an appliance, not a general purpose computer.

(Even if, in some cases, it as just a custom-built SBC running BusyBox, customers still aren't going to go digging through a custom network stack).

I encourage you to re-evaluate this. How many devices do you (or have you) own which have have a microcontroller? (This includes all your appliances, your clocks, and many things you own which use electricity.) How many of these have you reflashed with custom firmware?

Imagine any of your friends, family, or colleagues. (Including some non-programmers/hackers/embedded-engineers) What would their answers be?

On Android, according to the Coalition Against Stalkerware, there are over 1 million victims of deliberately placed spyware on an unlocked device by a malicious user close to the victim every year.

#2 is WAY more likely than #1. And that's on Android which still has some protections even with a sideloaded APK (deeply nested, but still detectable if you look at the right settings panels).

As for #3; the point is that it's a virus. You start with a webkit bug, you get into kernel from there (sometimes happens); but this time, instead of a software update fixing it, your device is owned forever. Literally cannot be trusted again without a full DFU wipe.

Yes. They're making the point that your flashing yellow warning is a good thing, and that it's helpful to the customer that a mechanism is in place to prevent it from being disabled by an attacker.

This guy thinks that if you rephrase an argument but put some symbols around it you’ve refuted it statistically.

P(robably not)

Clearly you’ve never met my ex’s (or a past employer). Not even being sarcastic this time.

Valve is doing great work.

Now… maybe we could condense the 10,000 pointless distros down to a dozen? Oops, nope. Now 10,001, except this one has the menu bar in the middle of the screen and it moves around.

What's the improved security argument for terminating VeraCrypt's account though? SB does have clear benefits but what is unclear is the motivation for the account termination.

What's the likelihood that this account ban provides zero security benefit to users and was instead a requirement from the gov because Veracrypt was too hard to crack/bypass.

> and bitlocker doesn't count.

Wat? Bitlocker is the answer to your question.

> In my limited experience with bitlocker, the disk is decryptable automatically as long as it's in the original motherboard.

It's unlocked (not decrypted) when the OS boots, yes. You can optionally enforce (not on Home) other unlock methods, such as PIN before the OS boots.

> I want my FDE to be based on a password or a keyfile, not simply by some code in the motherboard.

That's less secure than TPM.

The public keys are provided by the developer. Google, or Apple, for example. It's how they know that nothing was tampered with before it left the factory.

Do you lock your house or car and permanently handover the keys to some stranger, who you then have to depend on always to lock or unlock it for you?

We dont need to get philosophical here. You(the admin) can require you (the user) to input a password to signify to you(the admin) to install a ransomware when a link is clicked. That way no control is lost.

It's fair to think of secure boot in only the PC context but the model very much extends to phones. It seems ridiculous to me that to use a coupon for a big mac I have to compromise on what features my phone can run (either by turning on secure boot and limiting myself to stock os or limiting myself to the features and pricing of the 1 or 2 phones that allow re-locking).

No, they've presented a nonsense argument which Apple uses to ban all unofficial software and firmware as if it had some merit.

The argument is that P(customer wants to run their own firmware) cancels out and 2,3 are just the raw probability of you on the receiving end of an evil maid attack. If you think this is a high probability, a locked bootloader won’t save you.

And where are the stats for people running their own firmware and are not running stalkerware for comparison? You don’t need firmware access to install malware on Android, so how many of stalkerware victims actually would have been saved by a locked bootloader?

You expect that stuff to happy with 3 letter agencies.

If someone steals my laptop, and there is no factor of decryption requiring something I possess or know, then the only use of that disk being encrypted is that I can throw it out more safely at end of life. Thieves/LEO has the data because they have the motherboard.

If bitlocker has a PIN/passphrase decrypt option, then I missed it.

Nothing has been tampered with doesn't mean there's no factory backdoor, it just only means same as factory, nothing more.

No? I have locks on my house and car that I have the keys for. That an argument _for_ secure boot.

What if the cat pictures are an app too? The computer can't require a password specifically for ransomware, just for software in general. The UI flow for cat pictures apps and ransomware will be identical.

Very neat, but 1) is not really P(customer wants to run their own firmware), but P(customer wants to run their own firmware on their own device).

So, the first term in 1) and 2) are NOT the same, and it is quite conceivable that the probability of 2) is indeed higher than the one in 1) (which your pseudo-statistical argument aimed to refute, unsuccessfully).

Sorry, I have no idea what you are trying to say.

Apple or Google know what the cryptographic signature of the boot should be. They provide the keys. It's how they know that "factory reset" does not include covert code installed by the factory. That's what we're talking about.

The entirety of GrapheneOS is about 200K downloads per update. Malicious use therefore is roughly 5-1.

> You don’t need firmware access to install malware on Android, so how many of stalkerware victims actually would have been saved by a locked bootloader?

With a locked bootloader, the underlying OS is intact, meaning that the privileges of the spyware (if you look in the right settings panel) can easily be detected, revoked, and removed. If the OS could be tampered with, you bet your wallet the spyware would immediately patch the settings system, and the OS as a whole, to hide all traces.

A computer that can run arbitrary programs can necessarily run malicious ones. Useful operations are often dangerous, and a completely safe computer isn't very useful.

Some sandboxing and a little friction to reduce mistakes is usually wise, but a general-purpose computer that can't be broken through sufficiently determined misuse by its owner is broken as designed.

Assuming that we accept your premise that the most popular custom firmware for Android is stalkerware (I don’t). This is of course, a firmware level malware, which of course acts as a rootkit and is fully undetectable. How did the coalition against stalkerware, pray tell, manage to detect such an undetectable firmware level rootkit on over 1 million Android devices?

LineageOS alone has around 4 million active users. So malicious use is at most 1:4, not 5:1.