There is no "bypassing", Israel has never shipped anything through the Strait of Hormuz in the first place. The country borders the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, not the Persian Gulf.
The entire article is predicated on the premise that it would be bad if Iran lobbed missiles at ICL's bromide facilities, but it's not in Iran's own interests either to cripple semiconductor production, and given the distance and inaccuracy of their missiles, they'd struggle even if they tried. (It's too far for drones.)
"Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress."
Same thing happened with oil in 70s -- everyone was sure that oil is going to end. But as with lithium I'm pretty sure the world would find another place to source bromine.
That's why biological systems look so wasteful (chlorophyll reflecting the more abundant wavelength, etc.)
I hate title case.
Why do I feel like every war is an opportunity to create artificial scarcity?
The article fails to mention the fourth lever: cessation of hostilities, recognition of Iranian sovereignty, reparations for the displaced peoples of the region and curtailment of Israeli expansionist ambitions.
If achieved, none of the collosal amounts of capital expenditure and effort required to immediately secure redundant alternatives to the Bromine supply chain would need to be exerted.
Wait what?
Really - “ At ICL’s Sdom facility, the Dead Sea brines…”
I always assumed it was gone for good … weird. I did not know that name was still in use …
I'm not keeping track, but some of the things we ran out of include sand, helium, tellurium, tantalum, niobium, bees...
https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026.pdf
One of the last things anyone is going to run out of.
https://www.theregister.com/2022/03/11/ukraine_neon_supplies...
The US is a major producer of bromine.[1] It's not at all rare. It's just that the cheapest source is the Dead Sea, because that's concentrated brine. There are bromine wells in Arkansas. It's a by-product from some oil wells. It's in seawater. In California alone, the Salton Sea and the SF salt evaporator ponds are potential sources.
If the price goes up, the use of bromine for pool chemicals and fracking fluids will be affected long before the semiconductor industry.
[1] https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026-bromine.pd...
Everything from Peak Oil to today has the globalized market/trade machine meeting the needs continuously with only leaf nodes for products being the constraint. Almost all inputs have been commoditized.
Joking aside, is this what those brine ponds were for — the ones you see from the air on approach to SFO — or were they just for regular sea salt?
the current generation of drones - using cheap ICE engines from mopeds and small bikes - gets up to 2000km range.
TFA is not about ordinary bromine used in the chemical industry, which is extremely cheap and easily available everywhere.
TFA is about semiconductor-grade pure bromine, which, like all chemical substances used in the semiconductor industry is very expensive and it is not produced by most bromine producers.
Nobody in this thread has pointed to any evidence that USA produces semiconductor-grade pure bromine. The fact that it produces ordinary bromine is irrelevant.
How many of us thought "hmm I wonder what the next one of these is, and how do I invest"?
This dismissive contrarian Pollyanna attitude might serve well to minimise your personal anxiety, but I do not see how what you are saying is in any way the correct approach for making decisions or managing risk.
This is not some article saying that the sky is falling without evidence. It is not even an article saying the sky is falling with evidence. It is an article that says that there is a significant risk, due to an entirely preventable man-made problem, where steps can be taken now to reduce the medium-term impact of the problem. And then it lists those steps. Why is this not OK to you?
It only seems like nothing happens if you stop paying attention.
So for some people it will run out based on that, but it will never be gone.
There is manufactured sand, but obviously it's more expensive than good old extraction of river beds and beaches, which is scarce.
https://web.archive.org/web/20140705163239/http://na.unep.ne...
Nobody will ever run out of bromine or of silicon. But if the very few purification plants for silicon or for bromine were destroyed today, the semiconductor manufacturing would be suspended for a few years, until other purification plants would be built.
Your USGS article does not say a single word about semiconductor-grade pure bromine, so it is irrelevant for this discussion.
Bromine itself is extremely cheap and easy to produce, like silicon.
Nevertheless pure bromine and pure silicon are very expensive and they are produced in few places around the world.
So you may have millions of tons of bromine, but if none of it has the required purity grade you must stop semiconductor device production until you build a purification facility, which requires money, time and know-how.
The article cites "multiple occasions" in which Iranian missiles got through and hit the Negev region. Follow the link and that's two incidents almost a month ago, when Iran tried to hit the nuclear research facility. They hit one town 35km north and another 20km to the west. Those are the only strikes the article cites in the area. That was in the early days of the war, when Iran was firing their most precise missiles, in direct response to US-Israeli attacks on Iran's Natanz nuclear facility and still...
The ICL bromine facility is another 25km to the west of that town, or 40km from the nuclear research facility. There's not a lot of industrial or residential in the area. If they manage to hit anything, it'll almost certainly be the evaporation pools.
Okay but then "The mechanism of disruption does not require a direct hit on an ICL facility" but then that paragraph is the most circumstantial. The mechanism is insurance rates, which apply for any ship that docks at an Israeli port? How are those going to go up any more than they already are with a near miss, and if so, how is that not just standard above-average wartime inflation? How are the ships with the bromine not going to get to South Korea via the Mediterranean if insurance rates rise?
But really what's the likelihood that Iran is going to fire off whatever of its remaining stocks of still very imprecise missiles are left, to try to hit a needle in a haystack target with nothing else around for collateral damage?
There's often a really weird undercurrent of nationalism that springs up in these dicussions as if its' "a country" that does something well as a function of being that country, not as a function of an economic opportunity and ramp up.
"Critically, ICL’s hydrogen bromide gas production, including the semiconductor-grade output supplied to South Korean fabrication plants, is manufactured at the same Sodom facility where extraction occurs, meaning extraction and conversion infrastructure are co-located in the same vulnerable corridor."
What decisions or risk management can I reasonably take to mitigate the Bromine chokepoint? Or most of these deep pipeline logistics issues?
Try to plan purchase with more lead time, look for alternatives beyond the original sales market, accept alternatives with less than originally desired specs or accept more than desired price?
When are those not prudent anyway?
I can't make a bromide conversion plant, and my influence on governments is minimal.
This is literally the thesis of each and every one of these articles. Only one mine in the world can produce sand for semiconductors, etc. It makes the arguments incredibly persuasive and the predictions almost always wrong.
In reality... I'd wager that the semiconductor industry uses very little bromine compared to say, plastics; and that it can be recycled or sourced from other places with minimal technological investment (e.g., as a simple byproduct of salt production in the US).
Then the title "Could Halt Production of the World’s Memory Chips" is a lie.
I guess not.
This is a difficult target, with far more defences to overwhelm.
Doing so would have far-reaching consequences.
https://www.recyclingtoday.com/news/aluminum-association-com...
The main reason being: materials are cheap - plant time is what's expensive.
First, raw materials are such a small fraction of chip costs that even if the market price of a given material spikes up two orders of magnitude briefly, the market can eat the spike. For many broadly used materials, this alone is "end of story" - the majority of consumers will balk at the price and exit the market long before semiconductors supply chains will. And second, between the costs of halting production and the low volumes of actual materials involved, supply buffers exist on sites. That plays against supply chain fragility.
It's one thing to have everything JITted within an inch of its life on a razor thin margins car plant. It's another matter entirely to have a "potential supply disruption" in semiconductor manufacturing that will, if all supply truly and fully stopped tomorrow, convert to actual stopped plants in 4 months unless something is done about it in the meanwhile. And that "unless something is done" bites hard when you have a lot of engineering capability underlined by general price insensitivity. As semiconductor industry does.
This is what govt is good for, in respects to ensuring materials supply continuity for their domestic markets
Bromine with a semiconductor-grade purity, like any other chemical substance that may be used in semiconductor device manufacturing, must pass through a very long and energy-consuming purification process, which can be done in few places besides that from Israel that is mentioned in TFA.
If you have one event with a 10% chance of throwing off the world’s semiconductors, that’s incredibly dangerous and worth talking about. If you have five such things (the quartz mine, bromine conversion, helium supply, etc.), there is a 60% chance that none of those events land.
Even still, it’s worth raising alarm about each and every one of them, because a single failure causes so much collateral damage. But people assume if something didn’t happen, it wasn’t worth prepping for.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bromine#Occurrence_and_product...
The largest producer outside the Dead Sea is China by far, and the only other significant producer is Japan (!) which produces a paltry ~10% of worldwide output. It's possible to produce bromine from other places but you'd basically be starting from zero on the infrastructure involved. The short-term risks are real.
https://www.reportlinker.com/dataset/6b01d1a976f7ec9db71e35b...
However, it may be hard for Iran to disrupt bromine production. They may also not think about it.
EDIT: According to other links in this thread the US produces a significant but undisclosed (?!) quantity of bromine, practically all of which is consumed domestically. So it was probably missing from my data. Not great for other bromine users.
TLDR: historical brine production and modern wetlands restoration.
You can’t have slack in a system and be efficient, because it would be more efficient to use up all 100% of the (cheapest) capacity.
There is a fundamental tradeoff between the two that capitalists chasing 1% margins discover only when there is a disaster somewhere.
That is what "choke" means in the global economy perspective. Even slight price increase on such material can cause inflation and that's everyone's problem.
We went from supply chain shocks due to COVID, to a sift landing, to inflation, to supply chain instability due to tariffs, to petrochemical instability due to stupidity and ego. Plus the delusion that AI is going to fix everything Real Soon Now.
I don’t know how businesses make rational long range plans when the major actors are operating far from rational.
The US willingly jump into the Short Victorious trap without planning. We retired our Minesweepers, four of 11 carries are in process for repair, refurbishing, and refueling. Our allies are fine with letting us clean up our mess. And our diplomatic strategy seems to be Because we said so.
So when the big things are being handled this badly, I’m sure plenty of little things are ready to bite us in the ass.
The semiconductor industry does not use ordinary chemical substances, but only special semiconductor-grade pure substances, which are many orders of magnitude more pure than the so-called "pure" substances that are used elsewhere in the chemical industry.
It is absolutely irrelevant that substances like ordinary bromine and ordinary silicon are very abundant and very cheap. The semiconductor industry cannot use them and the corresponding semiconductor-grade pure substances are far more expensive and their availability is limited by the production capacities of the very few producers that exist for them around the world.
If the few existing production plants for any semiconductor-grade pure substance were destroyed, semiconductor device manufacturing would be stopped for a few years, until new purification plants are built.
TFA argues that in order to avoid such risks, there should be more purification plants in geographically-diverse locations, for instance that one such purification plant should be built in USA, where there are local producers of ordinary bromine, that would provide the raw material.
If you're referring to Spruce Pine in the aftermath of Hurricane Helene [0, 1], the predictions that chipmaking would be severely disrupted turned out to not come true because the Spruce Pine mine sustained a lot less damage than initially feared and was made operational within a week or two [2], not because high-purity quartz is commoditized.
[0] https://www.npr.org/2024/09/30/nx-s1-5133462/hurricane-helen...
[1] https://www.aveva.com/en/our-industrial-life/type/article/hu...
[2] https://www.cbs17.com/news/north-carolina-news/spruce-pine-q...
In 1973, Velsicol Chemical Corporation, who was operating in St. Louis, Michigan at the time, was manufacturing Polybrominated biphenyl fire retardant, as well as animal feed supplements. They were bagged similarly, and PBBs were accidentally shipped into the food supply. Which led to the largest livestock culling in US history at the time. https://www.michigan.gov/mdhhs/safety-injury-prev/environmen...
I'm sure it would take a long time to make this process fit for mass bromine recycling, but it's a bit hard to take the rest of the article seriously.
One case study involves economic coercion.
(Disclosure: I worked with the author, although not on this paper)
At the moment. We could purify bromine gas anywhere and extraction and purification don’t need to be co-located. But at the moment, the purification and extraction in Israel are co-located, which is why this is more of an immediate risk than a long term one. However, it does take time to get new production online and no one will spend the capital to build a new purification facility that will go unused after the conflict is over.
But unless we have an extra 250 million tonnes of production capacity sitting on the sidelines, which would probably mean more than doubling our total output, we're not going to make up the shortfall for anyone else. We're talking about the majority of (disclosed) global production going offline if Iran could manage it (though again it is not clear that they can or will). China will also probably be using everything that they produce. Europe and the rest of Asia will be left high and dry. It's a win for the US strategy of critical minerals resilience, in some sense, but it's still a problem.
Of course any of these problems can be solved in a long time, 5-10 years.
The article is talking about the problems of between potentially supply being shut off tomorrow and being fixed in "a long time". Not good times.
I think the world is much, much more varied and complex than these "this is the one true doom" mindsets can fathom. It's a constructed theory that makes perfect sense until it meets the real world.
However, the construction of such a purification plant can take years, so TFA argues that it should be done ASAP, instead of waiting for some catastrophe that would destroy the existing plants, when this would be too late.
Interestingly I asked both Claude and ChatGPT "does the Infectious Substances Shipping Regulations include anything about what routes for airfreight are allowed?" and it flagged it and wouldn't respond, although switching to Sonnet 4 allowed Claude to answer.
Anyways, with that out of the way:
Quote me where I talked about difficulty of bringup (layperson: “ramping up”) production.
(I’m assuming that that is the “claim” that you think I made that you are referring to. If it’s not, please enlighten me.)
Unless you can quote me, you’re just coming up with something in your head and arguing with me about it. In fact, in my post, I made some light allusions to the not-insubstantial cost of a bringup.
The article is timely as it suggests yet another unconsidered risk factor of this war - USA could destroy its own stock market. Or Iran could accelerate that with one missile. I like to think the US military know this hence obsession with missile destruction but it is reasonable based on recent behaviour to assume that the MAGA overlords can't even spell bromine nevermind understand the risk.
I imagine he goes through a lot of glassware.
The EPA has been heating the ground in St. Louis to above boiling, with a giant rubber cap on top to boil off volatiles and collect them: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=smHnFXrhSvM and that's after dredging the river, capping the whole site with clay and concrete, and other remediational work. People will never be able to drink the well water there again.
Take-away is that I'd like to live as far away from chemical plants as I can afford.
The purification processes for any of the substances used in the semiconductor industry are quite complicated and they are done in few places around the world. For many pure substances, major suppliers are located in Germany or Japan.
The substances with a semiconductor-grade purity are much more expensive than the ordinary substances. Being one thousand times more expensive is not unusual, which demonstrates the difficulty of the purification processes.
Semiconductor-grade purity bromine is orders of magnitude more expensive than ordinary bromine and the vast majority of bromine producers do not make it.
The USGS article provides no evidence that such bromine is made in USA. I would rather expect Japan to be a producer, not USA, because for many semiconductor-grade purity chemical substances there are major producers in Japan.
Korea does not like to depend on imports from Japan, so I would not be surprised if there was a Japanese source of pure bromine but Korea prefers to import it from Israel. If this were true, they could still switch suppliers in case of a shortage.
The U.S.-Israeli war with Iran, now in an unstable ceasefire, has exposed a structural failure in the global semiconductor memory supply chain, and it is not the one analysts seem to be tracking. The story receiving attention is helium: Qatar’s Ras Laffan facility went offline, a 45-day inventory clock started running, and spot prices doubled within days. The story receiving almost no attention is bromine, and it is potentially the more dangerous one. Bromine is the raw material from which specialized chemical suppliers produce semiconductor-grade hydrogen bromide gas, the etch chemical that South Korean fabs use to carve the transistor structures in every Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM) and NAND flash chip on earth. A DRAM chip powers active computation and loses its contents the moment power cuts. A NAND chip retains data without power and underlies every form of digital storage. Together they underpin every modern computing device, from the phone in your pocket to the data center running your AI applications.
South Korea sources 97.5 percent of its bromine imports from Israel. Beyond that vulnerable concentration, converting bromine into semiconductor-grade hydrogen bromide gas requires dedicated purification infrastructure, and producers outside Israel are already fully committed to existing customers and stretched too thin to absorb additional demand. Building new conversion capacity takes years of permitting, equipment procurement, and fabrication qualification.
ICL Group, the Israeli multinational formerly known as Israel Chemicals Ltd., currently continues Dead Sea operations. Israel routes most trade through Mediterranean ports at Haifa and Ashdod, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz entirely. But Iran has been striking the Negev — Israel’s southern desert and the heart of its defense and industrial infrastructure — with ballistic missiles for three weeks, hitting Dimona and Arad, both within 35 kilometers of ICL’s Dead Sea extraction and conversion complex. If Israeli bromine production is displaced, there are no conversion facilities outside Israel capable of immediately producing semiconductor-grade hydrogen bromide gas at the scale required to replace it, and policymakers have not yet acted on that fact.
The vulnerability sits in plain sight, within missile range and outside any meaningful policy response. A disruption would be immediate and global. Within weeks, shortages would propagate across everything from consumer devices to military systems.
Bromine’s role in semiconductor manufacturing is specific and non-substitutable. Its primary derivative, hydrogen bromide, is consumed at the polysilicon etching stage foundational to both DRAM and NAND flash production. Each DRAM memory cell requires a polysilicon gate electrode etched with extreme precision over a silicon oxide layer as thin as 20 angstroms. Hydrogen bromide gas plasmas achieve a polysilicon-to-oxide selectivity ratio of 100 to 1, while chlorine-based alternatives achieve roughly 30 to 1. At advanced DRAM node geometries, that is the difference between a functional transistor and a destroyed one. Bromine also appears in chemical vapor deposition processes and chip packaging. There is no viable near-term substitute in any of these applications.
Three structural realities determine why the gap cannot be bridged through market reallocation. First, bromine already converted for industrial use such as flame retardants and drilling fluids cannot be reconverted. Those processes are chemically irreversible at any industrial scale and the resulting compounds cannot meet the parts-per-billion purity specifications that fabrication facilities require. The two supply chains draw from the same raw material but diverge permanently at the point of conversion. Second, converting raw bromine to semiconductor-grade hydrogen bromide gas requires dedicated purification infrastructure, specifically gas-phase distillation columns capable of lowering trace metals to parts-per-billion contamination levels. That infrastructure does not exist at scale outside the existing semiconductor chemical supply chain, and building more facilities requires permitting, equipment procurement, testing, and fabrication qualification measured in years. Third, producers such as Resonac, Air Liquide, and Adeka manufacture semiconductor-grade hydrogen bromide gas outside Israel, but their combined capacity is already committed to existing customers: Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the world’s dominant contract chipmaker; Samsung, the leading producer of DRAM and high-bandwidth memory; and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, China’s largest state-backed foundry. Critically, those customers are not holding steady: AI infrastructure buildout is accelerating demand across the board, meaning outside producers are stretched thin against a growing baseline. Even if outside producers could expand output, South Korean facilities would be competing for that capacity with Taiwan, Samsung’s own logic plants, and China, all of whom face the same accelerating demand.
The Dead Sea is among the most bromine-rich bodies of water on earth. ICL Group, which extracts at the lowest cost of any producer globally, dominates a supply that Israel and Jordan together account for roughly two thirds of globally. Critically, ICL’s hydrogen bromide gas production, including the semiconductor-grade output supplied to South Korean fabrication plants, is manufactured at the same Sodom facility where extraction occurs, meaning extraction and conversion infrastructure are co-located in the same vulnerable corridor. Iranian missiles have already penetrated Israeli air defenses in the Negev on multiple occasions, wounding nearly 200 people in Dimona and Arad, both in the same geographic corridor as ICL’s production and conversion sites.
The mechanism of disruption does not require a direct hit on an ICL facility. War risk insurance for vessel calls at Israeli ports has already risen from 0.2 percent to between 0.7 and 1.0 percent of vessel value per seven-day call, adding up to $500,000 in costs per voyage on a mid-sized cargo ship. Even for ships routed through the Mediterranean rather than the Red Sea, those insurance costs apply the moment a vessel calls at an Israeli port. The war risk premium follows the port, not the route. ZIM, Israel’s primary shipping line, has implemented a “war risk premium surcharge” on all cargo to and from Israel. Haifa oil refinery — the country’s largest — was shut down after its power station was damaged in an Iranian attack, demonstrating that critical industrial infrastructure does not require a direct strike to be forced offline. The downstream consequences of even a partial disruption to that corridor would propagate immediately across the global memory supply chain.
Samsung and SK hynix together dominate approximately 70 percent of the global DRAM market. SK hynix alone holds roughly 57 percent of the high bandwidth memory market. Since DRAM and NAND underpin every modern computing device, a supply disruption would propagate across the full consumer and industrial electronics stack, not only AI infrastructure. High bandwidth memory — a specialized form of DRAM stacked vertically to deliver the data speeds that AI accelerators such as Nvidia’s graphics processing units require — is sold out through 2026, and DRAM suppliers hold only two to three weeks of inventory. A shortage would force both companies to allocate scarce hydrogen bromide gas to their highest-value lines — high bandwidth memory for AI accelerators — at the expense of commodity DRAM and NAND used in phones, personal computers, laptops, and data storage. The consequences fall hardest across Africa, South Asia, and Latin America, where memory already accounts for 15 to 20 percent of the bill of materials for a mid-range smartphone. That share rises sharply for budget devices, the primary gateway to digital participation across Africa, South Asia, and Latin America. Smartphone prices in Bangladesh have already risen 10 to 25 percent in 2026 as a direct result of DRAM and NAND inflation, with similar increases reported in Nigeria and South Africa. Budget smartphones are reverting to 4 gigabytes of RAM in 2026, precisely as on-device AI features demand more, not less. A bromine supply shock would price hundreds of millions of people out of the devices through which they access banking, education, healthcare, and economic opportunity.
The exposure extends beyond commercial technology. The majority of guidance systems, radar modules, and electronic warfare packages fielded by the U.S. military run on DRAM and NAND flash chips sourced from the same commercial facilities, on the same allocation logic, with less procurement flexibility than commercial customers. Since the Defense Department shifted to commercial off-the-shelf procurement in the 1990s, there is no separate defense-grade memory supply chain. A shortage that forces Samsung and SK hynix to prioritize high-margin high bandwidth memory for AI customers would deprioritize the commodity DRAM used in precision-guided munitions, intelligence platforms, and shipboard radar systems, with no government visibility into how that allocation decision gets made. The same war straining ICL’s operational continuity is simultaneously depleting munitions stockpiles whose guidance systems depend on the same memory supply chain. The supply stress and the demand spike are running in the same direction at the same time.
The consequences for American AI follow directly from the South Korean exposure but run through a supply chain that most U.S. policymakers have never traced. Every Nvidia Blackwell and Rubin graphics processing unit requires high-bandwidth memory stacks that come almost entirely from SK hynix and Samsung, as SK hynix is Nvidia’s primary high-bandwidth memory supplier for both platforms. Microsoft, Amazon, Google, and Meta are deploying hundreds of billions of dollars in AI infrastructure on delivery schedules that assume South Korean plants will have uninterrupted access to the etch chemicals they need. A bromine disruption produces delivery slippage, renegotiated contracts, higher spot prices, and delayed server deployments.
Three levers are available, and they require action simultaneously. First, the most immediate is physical pre-positioning. Arkansas bromine from Albemarle and TETRA Technologies cannot be used directly in chip production, but it could serve as feedstock for semiconductor-grade hydrogen bromide gas conversion if that infrastructure existed, which is precisely the gap that ought to be closed. South Korean companies could also establish bromine forward contracts locking in supply and price for 12 to 18 months.
Second, the single most important structural action is the one with the longest lead time: building semiconductor-grade hydrogen bromide gas conversion capacity outside Israel. The Chip 4 framework should be extended to include a critical materials annex with a coordinated allied program to site, permit, and fund dedicated gas-phase distillation infrastructure capable of achieving parts-per-billion purity in geographically diversified locations — particularly in South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Private firms will not build conversion infrastructure at this scale and speed without government mandate, offtake guarantees and permitting priority.
Third, each government should take action in their own lanes, but in a coordinated fashion. South Korea should designate bromine a critical mineral, mandate minimum inventory levels, and fund domestic conversion infrastructure jointly with Samsung and SK hynix. The United States should add bromine, semiconductor-grade hydrogen bromide gas, and the full range of specialty gases derived from bromine to the critical minerals list, and use Defense Production Act authority and CHIPS and Science Act funding to co-invest with allies in purification capacity on allied soil. Israel should formalize bromine as a strategic export commodity, harden ICL’s production sites against missile attack, and use the 2030 Dead Sea concession expiration to bring in allied capital in exchange for long-term supply priority.
In sum, the bromine risk sits outside every dashboard anyone is monitoring. The structural failure is not the war: It is that the global memory supply chain has built itself around a conversion chokepoint with no redundancy and no fallback. If ICL’s Sodom facility goes offline, the gap does not get filled. The action that matters most — building semiconductor-grade hydrogen bromide gas conversion capacity outside Israel — takes years. The actions available now — forward contracts, inventory mandates, and Arkansas feedstock development — buy months at best, not years. That gap is precisely why these three countries should move now, before an Iranian ballistic missile makes the answer irrelevant.
Alvin Camba, Ph.D., is lead scientist and director of research at Lyvi. He is also a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and a senior research fellow at Associated Universities, Inc. His book on Chinese megaprojects and coalition politics in Southeast Asia is in production at Cornell University Press.
**Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.
Image: NASA/GSFC/METI/ERSDAC/JAROS and U.S./Japan ASTER Science Team via NASA.